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Executive summary 
 
 This paper presents estimates for the first ever economic freedom rankings of the six Australian 
states. 
 An economic freedom index is constructed, from a scale from 0 to 10, across four dimensions: 
- government expenditure; 
- taxation; 
- government dependency; and 
- regulatory environment. 
 The higher the overall index value, the more economically free a jurisdiction is in relative terms. 
 To the greatest extent practicable, the fiscal and regulatory activities of all levels of Australian 
government are incorporated into the index. 
 With an overall economic freedom index score of 8.25, Western Australia is ranked as the 
relatively freest jurisdiction in Australia in 2011. 
 By contrast, Tasmania is ranked as the relatively least free jurisdiction of the six Australian 
states, with an economic freedom index score of 3.57. 
 The economic freedom ʻleague tableʼ ranking for 2011 is presented in the following table: 
 
Australian economic freedom index values and rankings, 2011 
 Government 
expenditures 
Taxation 
and debt 
Government 
dependency 
Regulatory 
environment 
Overall 
economic 
freedom 
Report 
card 
rank 
WA 9.90 6.60 9.17 7.34 8.25 A 
NSW 6.28 3.27 6.93 5.82 5.58 B 
Vic 5.88 2.58 7.29 4.33 5.02 C 
SA 3.59 3.40 4.21 8.80 5.00 D 
Qld 3.66 4.04 6.71 0.00 3.60 E 
Tas 0.00 5.47 0.00 8.81 3.57 F 
The formula used to calculate index values is: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) x 10. Vmax is the largest value found 
within the indicator component, Vmin is the smallest, and Vi is the observation to be transformed. 
 
 A preliminary empirical analysis suggests that there is a positive association between the growth 
in gross state product per capita across the states and an increase in the economic freedom 
index. 
 Politicians and bureaucrats in every state, including those lagging behind in the economic 
freedom index, should conduct economic reforms that cut the size of government, deregulate 
the economy, and reduce the extent of personal dependency upon government. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 ‘If I am right in laying down, as the fundamental principle of Liberalism, that each individual should 
 have secured to him the most absolute liberty, subject to such restrictions only, as are necessary to 
 secure equal liberty to all, then it follows that the state should take no steps to curtail the liberty of 
 any class, merely because it will confer an immediate advantage upon another class, even though that 
 other class happen to be much larger or more influential politically than the former.’ (Bruce Smith, 
 [1887] 2005, Liberty and Liberalism, p. 162) 
 
 
Economic freedom, or the ability of individuals to justly and non-coercively acquire, use and dispose 
of property as they each see fit, has long represented an animating principle of Western societies. 
The experience of history, and not to mention empirical studies, affirm the notion that greater levels 
of economic freedom tend to be associated with increasing economic prosperity and improved 
social wellbeing. 
 
Despite these benefits, governments have long engaged in activities to restrict economic freedom 
through excessive taxation, public spending and debt which misallocate scarce resources; providing 
social security benefits which quell incentives to work and save in the productive sector; and 
imposing regulatory burdens restricting the exercise of entrepreneurship by private sector economic 
agents. 
 
Australian governments at all levels interfere with our economic freedoms on a daily basis. In the 
absence of information it is difficult for taxpayers and citizens to determine which government is 
imposing policies more egregious to maintaining economic freedom, and the detrimental flow-on 
effects for long term economic and social improvements. 
 
There is a need to fill in this information gap with an Australian economic freedom index. 
 
This study contributes to the burgeoning economic freedom literature by providing rankings of 
relative economic freedom for the six Australian states in 2011. Indeed, this study is the first of its 
type for Australia, and follows many years of quantitative research undertaken by the likes of the 
Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation comparing Australia's economic freedom ranking with that 
of other countries.2 
 
An economic freedom index is developed which is composed of indicators pertaining to the level of 
expenditure, taxation and other fiscal activities, the extent of direct dependency by the population 
on governments for their income, and the regulatory environment maintained by governments. 
 
The indicators are derived from statistics of state and local government activities (where available) 
and, given the extensive federal involvement in Australian fiscal and regulatory affairs, the statistical 
information is then supplemented by data on commonwealth government activities depending on 
                                                          
2
 James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall, 2012, Economic Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report, 
Fraser Institute: Vancouver; Terry Miller, Kim R Holmes and Edwin J Feulner, 2013, 2013 Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage Foundation: Washington DC. 
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availability and applicability. The information used to construct the indicators, and ultimately the 
economic freedom index value, is drawn from publicly available sources and may be replicated by 
interested parties for their own purposes. 
 
There already exist several sub-national economic freedom indexes for other advanced economies. 
Most notable are the Fraser Instituteʼs annual Economic Freedom of North America report,3 and 
studies undertaken in recent years by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation-Liberales Institut 
(Germany), Centro Luigi Einaudi (Italy) and the Pacific Research Institute (United States).4 
 
Studies have also emerged which include economic freedom considerations alongside a broader 
suite of personal freedom indicators. For example, the Mercatus Center Freedom in the 50 States 
ranks the relative freedom of the US states using numerous economic, fiscal, personal and 
regulatory freedom indicators.5 
 
While this study does not assume the more comprehensive approach to quantifying relative 
personal freedom rankings, similar to that of the Mercatus Center research, in many respects it still 
provides a more comprehensive account of factors likely to affect economic freedom than most 
other available economic freedom indexes. In particular, the inclusion of government dependency 
and regulatory environment variables can be regarded as advances in this respect. 
 
As noted above, international rankings of economic freedom are now well established. Australia has 
ranked favourably in terms of the international economic freedom rankings in recent years, typically 
within the top five of rankings in terms of overall relative economic freedom scores. The economic 
freedom rankings of the Australian states published in this study should be taken as being 
complementary to the existing international rankings, and not supplanting them. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Avilia Bueno, Nathan J Ashby and Fred McMahon, with Deborah Martinez, 2012, Economic Freedom of North 
America 2012, Fraser Institute: Vancouver. 
4
 Ying Huang, Robert E McCormick and Lawrence J McQuillan, 2004, Economic Freedom Index: 2004, Pacific 
Research Institute: San Francisco; Gabrielle Guggiola and Giovanni Ronca, 2007, La libertà economica nel 
mondo, In Europa, in Italia, Centro Luigi Einaudi: Turin; Clemens Fuest, Roman Bertenrath and Patrick Welter, 
2010, Wirtschaftliche Freiheit in den deutschen Bundesländern, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and Liberales 
Institut: Cologne. 
5
 William P Ruger and Jason Sorens, 2011, Freedom in the 50 States: An Index of Personal and Economic 
Freedom, George Mason University, Mercatus Center: Arlington, VA. 
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2 An economic freedom index for the Australian federation: 
Methodology 
 
A range of indicators have been collated for the purpose of developing index values for various 
categories of economic freedom for the six Australian states (New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania). The index values for each component 
area are then used to inform the overall economic freedom index score for each jurisdiction. 
 
It is important to stress at the outset that the index values provided in this paper do not, and nor are 
they intended to, indicate the absolute degree of economic freedom which exists in each state. In 
any event, there remain significant debates among classical liberals and libertarians regarding the 
most appropriate size and scope of government, which are not addressed in this paper in detail.6 
 
The index presented here provides a relative ranking of the Australian states across four broad 
dimensions, or components, of economic freedom. Specifically, a higher economic freedom score 
accorded to a given jurisdiction implies that it is relatively more free compared with the others. 
 
Another important issue is that compared with most other federal systems of government, 
Australian federalism offers limited fiscal and policy autonomy for state and local governments. 
 
As a consequence of various economic, legal, political and social factors, the power to raise taxation 
revenues at least since the Second World War are relatively centralised in favour of the 
commonwealth government. 
 
Whereas numerous proposals have been made during the post-war period to decentralise taxing 
powers back to the state-local public sector, the general tendency within the Australian federation 
has been the transfer of additional expenditure, regulatory and other policy responsibilities to the 
commonwealth. The result of this process has led to some commentators referring to Australia as 
effectively lacking a genuine federalist system.7 
 
Given the extensive degree of centralisation of public sector activities in Australia it is deemed 
necessary to incorporate federal variables into the index wherever applicable, and subject to data 
availability (including data to impute values of commonwealth government activity across the 
states). This inclusion is necessary to the extent that the activities of the commonwealth 
government impinge on the degree of economic freedom enjoyed within each state. 
 
                                                          
6
 Some scholars most closely aligned to the anarcho-capitalist tradition in libertarian thought, from Gustave de 
Molinari to Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, consider it at least conceptually feasible for private 
sector entities to provide for basic protective services such as defence and policing. Many classical liberals, by 
contrast, appear to subscribe to the ‘minarchist’ tradition in liberal philosophy, which restricts government 
activities to protective functions only. Others who have self-identified themselves as classical liberals have, on 
occasions, enunciated more expansive views regarding the appropriate duties and responsibilities of 
government. 
7
 Dan Mitchell, ʻFederalism Spreads to the United Kingdomʼ, International Liberty blog, 
http://danieljmitchell.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/federalism-spreads-to-the-united-kingdom/. 
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The resultant indicators, components and overall index values can be construed as representing an 
ʻall-governmentʼ representation of relative economic freedom among the six jurisdictions. 
 
There are essentially two methods employed in the sub-national economic freedom index literature 
to generate index values, and thereby rankings, for jurisdictions. One method, adopted by the Fraser 
Instituteʼs Economic Freedom of North America project, uses a zero to ten scale for every indicator 
and component. In this case, zero corresponds to a relatively low level of economic freedom and ten 
corresponds with a relatively high level of economic freedom.8 
 
Finally, in an effort to avoid subjective value judgments about the relative importance of each 
indicator to overall relative economic freedom, each indicator was equally weighted and each 
component was equally weighted. 
 
The following indicators should not necessarily be construed as those which will definitively be used 
in subsequent editions of this index. In similar vein to other economic freedom indexes, the 
estimation methodology employed here may be occasionally altered by a host of factors, most 
importantly the availability of new data. To the greatest extent possible, future changes to the index 
methodology would be backdated to provide a consistent economic freedom index series over time. 
 
The following sections provide descriptions of each indicator utilised for each component of 
economic freedom. 
 
2.1 Component 1: Government expenditures 
 
Most classical liberal economists and philosophers agree that some necessarily limited degree of 
government is required. It can facilitate the protection of individuals from aggression from internal 
and external forces, and enables them to acquire, use and dispose of physical and intellectual 
properties without theft or other undue acts of confiscation. Activities within this category typically 
undertaken by the public sector include the financing and provision of defence, law enforcement, 
judicial services, and foreign affairs. 
 
At a stretch, some liberals also consider that governments could expediently finance and provide 
some goods and services, again of a limited range, which may not be otherwise provided profitably 
                                                          
8
 The formula used in the Fraser Institute study is: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) x 10. Vmax is the largest value 
found within the indicator component, Vmin is the smallest, and Vi is the observation to be transformed. 
Bueno, Ashby and McMahon, with Martinez, 2012, Economic Freedom of North America 2012, op. cit., p. 57. 
Another approach, used in a 2011 study by Ruger and Sorens, entails taking, for each jurisdiction on each 
indicator and component, the number of standard deviations from the mean, to reveal interjurisdictional 
differentials in economic freedom index values. For variables for which lower raw numbers are preferred, the 
formula under the Ruger-Sorens approach is: -(Vi - V(mean)) / stdev(V) where Vi is the observation to be 
transformed, V(mean) is the mean value for all values, and stdev(V) is the standard deviation for all values. The 
Fraser Institute approach is adopted in this paper, nonetheless the Ruger-Sorens formula was also applied to 
provide consistency checks, particularly for relatively high and low economically free jurisdictions in the small 
sample. Checks of the two ranking methodologies found no discernible differences in overall state rankings. 
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in sufficient quantum by the private sector. For example, this category of public sector activity has 
traditionally included economic infrastructure, such as road, bridge, rail and port facilities. 
 
In effect, all that the maintenance of economic freedom in the modern world necessitates is that 
government fiscal activities are of sufficient size and scope to ensure adequate, but minimal, levels 
of protective and productive activities.9 
 
However, in practice, as government continues to expand their functions beyond these core 
activities, and accordingly extend their spending, taxation and borrowings, the ability of the private 
sector entities to grow further becomes diminished. Consumer choices also become more restricted 
as growth in government fiscal activities progressively crowd out feasible non-governmental output 
alternatives. 
 
2.1.1 Indicator 1A: General government sector final consumption expenditure, 
percentage of  gross state product 
 
One of the many elements of government intervention in an economy is its role as a consumer of 
scarce resources. This not only deprives the private sector of direct consumption possibilities, but 
diverts resources away from individuals and businesses which could otherwise be used to expand 
their production. 
 
Government final consumption expenditure consists of expenditure, including imputed expenditure, 
incurred by the general government sector on both individual consumption goods and services and 
collective consumption services.10 
 
Consumption expenditure data for the state and local general government sectors are publicly 
provided for each state, as is expenditure by the commonwealth government allocated to each state 
on the basis where spending activity occurs.11 As discussed above, given the extensive fiscal role of 
the commonwealth in each jurisdiction the figures used in the development of this indicator 
comprise both state-local and commonwealth consumption expenditures. 
 
The greater the level of general government consumption expenditure within a given jurisdiction 
relative to the size of its economy (as indicated by gross state product (GSP)), the lower the relative 
economic freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
9
 James M Buchanan, 1975, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago. However it should be noted that it is not inconceivable for the private sector to perform numerous 
activities, including on behalf of the public sector, as a consequence of technological changes (e.g., radio 
transponders and satellite GPS), financing innovations (e.g., user charging) and other factors which deepen 
private market capabilities. 
10
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2012, Australian System of National Accounts: Concepts, Sources and 
Methods, Third Edition, ABS: Canberra. 
11
 Some commonwealth consumption expenditures are allocated to each state by the ABS in accordance with 
population or employment shares. ABS, Ibid.. 
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2.1.2 Indicator 1B: General government sector subsidy and transfer expenditure, 
percentage of  gross state product 
 
Governments also acquire fiscal resources from the population to redistribute to politically favoured 
groups. These groups may include other levels of government, business corporations, not-for-profit 
organisations and individuals. 
 
Information on the amount of subsidies and transfers are provided for each level of general 
government by the ABS, through the annual government financial statistics publication.12 
Commonwealth government subsidy and transfer expenditures are attributed to each state on the 
following basis: 
 
 Grants to state-local governments: Expenditures allocated on basis of state funding shares for 
general revenue assistance and specific purpose payments (including National Partnership 
Payments) in federal ʻFinal Budget Outlookʼ statements.13 
 Grants to universities: Expenditures allocated on basis of state funding shares of commonwealth 
government grants to tertiary education institutions, as reported in higher education finance 
statistics produced by the Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, 
Research and Tertiary Education.14 
 Other current transfers, and ʻotherʼ subsidies and transfers: Expenditures allocated on a per 
capita basis. 
 
The greater the share of government subsidy and transfer expenditures to GSP within a given 
jurisdiction, the lower the relative economic freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
 
2.1.3 Indicator 1C: General government sector gross fixed capital formation, percentage 
of gross state product 
 
Investment expenditures are undertaken by all levels of Australian government, which can 
potentially distort the allocation of capital by the private sector. Consistent with this, relatively 
greater levels of capital spending by governments will tend to reduce, or ʻcrowd out,ʼ similar 
expenditures by private market participants. 
 
The indicator used here is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GSP, by the commonwealth 
and state-local general government sectors. Although this analysis does not include capital spending 
by entities outside the general government sector, such as government trading enterprises, it is 
noted that the relative economic importance of such spending has declined over the past three 
decades, as a consequence of various privatisation and outsourcing initiatives. 
 
                                                          
12
 ABS, Government Finance Statistics, Australia, cat. no. 5512.0. 
13
 Commonwealth of Australia, various years, Final Budget Outlook. 
14
 Department of Industry, ʻHigher Education Statisticsʼ, 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/HigherEducation/HigherEducationStatistics/Pages/default.aspx. 
January 2014  Institute of Public Affairs 11 
 
The greater the level of general government gross fixed capital formation within a given jurisdiction 
relative to GSP, the lower the relative economic freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
2.2 Component 2: Taxation and debt 
 
Governments compulsorily acquire taxation revenue from individuals, businesses and other entities 
in order to fund the production and provision of certain goods and services. However by their very 
nature taxation represents a diminution of private property rights and, as the level of taxes increase, 
they more intensely restrict private production and consumption choices. 
 
Relatively high levels of taxation, in particular, distort market signals and hamper the rational 
allocation of scarce resources. Distortionary taxation reduce the incentives for economic agents to 
engage in productive behaviours, such as the exercise of entrepreneurship, saving and investment, 
and working. All of these effects conspire to retard economic growth. 
 
Another means through which governments finance their activities is through borrowing from 
domestic and external capital markets. The commonwealth and state governments sell their own 
bonds which raises loans with the promise to return bondholders the value of the principal plus 
interest on the coupon upon maturity. On the other hand, local government borrowings are 
coordinated by the financial investment arms of each state government or with the approval of the 
relevant state government minister. 
 
It is important to recognise that the debt burden of governments represents future taxation, in that 
taxpayers in future generations are obliged to repay the debt proceeds raised by their resident 
governments. These additional tax burdens, in turn, reduce the economic opportunities available to 
a community and thus dilute economic freedom. 
 
2.2.1 Indicator 2A: Direct taxation revenue, percentage of gross state product 
 
Direct taxes are generally defined as those which may be adjusted in accordance with the individual 
characteristics of the taxpayer.15 The direct taxes used in the development of this indicator include 
personal and corporate income taxes imposed by the commonwealth government, and payroll taxes 
imposed by the states. 
 
The ABS presents statistics which break down taxation revenues collected by state and local 
governments in each jurisdiction. Aggregate taxation data for the commonwealth government is also 
presented, however the ABS does not provide a state-by-state split of this information. 
 
This paper imputes commonwealth government revenues acquired from personal and corporate 
income taxation according to the following methodology: 
 
                                                          
15
 Anthony B Atkinson and Joseph E Stiglitz, 1976, ʻThe Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxationʼ, 
Journal of Public Economics 6: 55-75. 
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 State-level data for personal income tax (net of deductions), on a residence basis, were obtained 
from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). 
 The allocation of corporate income taxes by state was made on the basis of each stateʼs share of 
national gross operating surplus (less general government activities and ownership of dwellings). 
 Fringe benefits tax and superannuation guarantee charges were allocated to each state on a per 
capita basis. 
 
The direct tax revenue data were then expressed as a share of GSP for each state. The greater the 
direct taxation revenue to GSP ratio within a given jurisdiction, the lower the relative economic 
freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.2 Indicator 2B: Indirect taxation revenue, percentage of gross state product 
 
Australian governments also impose a range of indirect taxes, levied on certain transactions 
irrespective of the circumstances of sellers or buyers. These include taxes on property, the provision 
of goods and services, and the use of goods and performance of activities. 
 
The ABS taxation revenue statistics collection includes information about state land taxes, stamp 
duties on land transfers and other financial transactions, taxes on gambling, insurance and motor 
vehicles, and other taxes. Local taxes on the unimproved value of land are also included in this 
indicator. 
 
Several commonwealth indirect taxes are assigned to each state using the following formula: 
 
 GST revenue was attributed to each state on the basis of national household consumption 
expenditure (less spending on food, education and health care) shares. 
 Customs duties were attributed to states using state shares of total merchandise imports. 
 Crude oil and LPG excises was attributed to each state by converting data on barrels produced 
into a volumetric measure of production of crude and LPG (in tonnes), drawing upon data 
published by the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA).16 
 Other excises were attributed to each state using state shares of alcoholic beverage and tobacco 
consumption. 
 
In a similar fashion to direct taxation, total indirect taxes were expressed as a share of GSP. The 
greater the indirect taxation revenue to GSP ratio within a given jurisdiction, the lower the relative 
economic freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.3 Indicator 2C: General government sector gross debt, percentage of gross state 
product 
 
                                                          
16
 Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, ʻIndustry statisticsʼ, 
http://www.appea.com.au/industry-in-depth/industry-statistics/. 
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Data on the level of gross debt for the Australian state and local public sectors are sourced from ABS 
government finance statistics. Commonwealth government gross debt data is attributed to each 
state on the basis of each jurisdictionʼs share of commonwealth total expenditure.17 This data is then 
deflated by the gross state product of each jurisdiction. 
 
The index score for this indicator implies that the greater the gross debt to GSP ratio within a given 
jurisdiction, the lower the relative economic freedom score received by that jurisdiction. 
 
2.3 Component 3: Government dependency 
 
A feature of modern democratic government is the significant numbers of individuals and families 
who depend upon subsidies and other government payments for their incomes. These include the 
salaries paid to public sector employees, and welfare benefits provided in the form of income, 
housing, child support, student aid and other assistance. 
 
The degree of dependency upon government is extensive, and the taxes raised to fund the 
enormous array of governmental payments deprive affected individuals of some income required for 
their own self reliance, diluting economic freedom in the process. 
 
Some minimal level of public sector administration is necessary for a functioning system of 
constitutional government operating under the rule of law. However, the costs associated with 
growing public sector employment are coercively financed by the taxpaying public working within 
the private sector. Compounding this, growing employment opportunities in the public sector tends 
to draw labour away from private opportunities. 
 
Finally, public policy bureaucrats are employed to advise and administer taxation and regulatory 
policies which restrict the scope for exercising economic freedoms, while inefficient services 
provided by public sector workers crowds out private and non-government services and distorts 
resources allocation.18 
 
The welfare state also encourages a sense of dependence by recipients upon the subsidies and other 
payments provided by the government. It also depresses incentives that could encourage welfare 
recipients to participate in the productive sector of the economy. The tendency towards 
dependency by welfare state beneficiaries can span over long time periods, even stretching across 
generations within families. 
 
The most notable aspects of discouraged economic participation rendered by the welfare state 
include the lower levels of engagement in labour markets, as well as lower levels of home and 
private property ownership. 
                                                          
17
 Calculated as the sum of final consumption expenditure, expenditure on subsidies and transfers, and gross 
fixed capital formation. 
18
 Julie Novak, 2012, Razor Cuts, Not Paper Cuts: A Framework for Rightsizing Commonwealth Government 
Employment, Institute of Public Affairs, Occasional Paper. 
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Another aspect of the welfare state, as part of the broader impetus towards government 
dependency that it delivers, has been the substantial elimination of voluntary and charitable 
activities. These used to be undertaken by religious orders, unions, mutual aid societies, 
neighbourhood associations, and business philanthropists. What remains of the non-government 
charitable sector has generally been co-opted into the broader welfare state system through 
extensive government grants. 
 
In addition, the growth of the welfare state is associated with changing cultural attitudes towards 
private sector entrepreneurship. This is typified by a growing acceptability of the sentiment that it is 
appropriate, and indeed moral, to confiscate part of the incomes of business owners and others 
earning their own income, to support those in need. 
 
2.3.1 Indicator 3A: Total public sector employment, percentage of population 
 
Data on total public sector employment is provided by the ABS. The coverage of this data is 
reasonably comprehensive, comprising employment in all public sector entities except for defence 
forces, employees based outside Australia, workersʼ compensation employees not on the public 
payroll, and office holders of public sector organisations not paid a salary.19 
 
The ABS allocates state and local government employment data by jurisdiction on an annual basis, 
and performs a similar allocation with regard to commonwealth government employment data. This 
data is then deflated by the size of the estimated labour force within each jurisdiction.20 
 
Similar to the other indicators presented thus far, the greater the share of public sector employment 
within the total labour force of a given jurisdiction, the lower the economic freedom score of that 
jurisdiction. 
 
2.3.2 Indicator 3B: Social security payment recipients, percentage of population 
 
Governments have long extended subsidies and other payments to certain individuals, which 
encourage dependence by recipients upon government support and reduce the disposable incomes 
available to those coerced to finance the welfare state. 
 
The Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs maintains 
information on the number of recipients of commonwealth social security payments directed to 
individuals by state.21 
 
                                                          
19
 ABS, Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, 2011-12, cat. no. 6248.0.55.002. 
20
 ABS, Labour Force, Australia, cat. no. 6202.0. 
21
 Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FAHCSIA), various years, 
Income support customers: A statistical overview, FaHCSIA: Canberra. 
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These include recipients of the Age Pension, Disability Support Pension, Sickness Allowance, Widow 
B Pension, Wife Pension, Carer Payment, Austudy and ABSTUDY payments, Newstart Allowance, 
Partner Allowance, Mature Age Allowance, Widow Allowance, Parenting Payment (Single and 
Partnered), and Special Benefit. 
 
This compilation of the numbers of people reliant upon public sector payments is not exhaustive, as 
it excludes cash or in-kind assistance provided by the commonwealth government to families and 
other groups. The data also excludes state and local government cash and in-kind social assistance, 
although the receipt of commonwealth social security payments is often a criterion for the receipt of 
state-local payments. 
 
For this indicator, the greater the share of social security payment recipients within the total 
estimated resident population of a given jurisdiction, the lower the economic freedom score of that 
jurisdiction. 
 
2.3.3 Indicator 3C: Social security cash benefits, percentage of gross household income 
 
Another indicator of the extent of government dependency is the share of government social 
security payments in the total income of a household, with a greater share of government payments 
to total income implying relatively greater dependence upon government and therefore a greater 
reluctance on the part of household members to seek their incomes from private sector activities. 
 
The ABS state accounts provides annual estimates of social assistance benefits in cash to residents, 
incorporating commonwealth and state payments such as scholarships, maternity, sickness and 
unemployment benefits, child endowment and family allowances, widows' age, invalid and 
repatriation pensions.22 The quantum of these expressed are expressed as a percentage of total 
gross household income earned in each jurisdiction. 
 
The greater the percentage share of social security cash benefits to income of a given jurisdiction, 
the lower the economic freedom score of that jurisdiction. 
 
2.4 Component 4: Regulatory environment 
 
Government regulations entail a host of pervasive effects upon economic freedom, affecting the 
ability of individuals and businesses to utilise property and other resources in accordance with their 
own needs and circumstances. 
 
In addition to the direct tax costs of maintaining regulatory administrations, regulations are usually 
associated with the imposition of a series of compliance costs upon regulated individuals and 
businesses. These can range from the costs of filing paperwork to labour retraining and capital 
refurbishment costs to comply with regulation, as well as project delay costs associated with waiting 
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 ABS, Australian System of National Accounts: Concepts, Sources and Methods, Third Edition, cat. no. 5216.0. 
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for regulatory approval.23 Regulatory compliance costs can divert scarce resources to other uses not 
otherwise preferred by those subject to the regulation, diluting economic freedom in the process. 
 
Regulations diminish economic freedom by restricting the scope for private sector entrepreneurship 
to those production possibilities permissible under regulation, constraining the capacity for 
entrepreneurial discovery and insight to promote economic development.24 This entails nothing less 
than an artificial hindering of the most important facets of economic conduct: the utilisation of 
human knowledge and exercise of creativity. 
 
In addition to changes in government expenditure and taxation policy, changes in regulatory policy 
can reduce investments and other productive activities by limiting the ability of entrepreneurs to 
confidently establish how future policies will affect their property rights.25 This hampers innovation 
by discouraging productive risk-taking behaviours in the marketplace. 
 
In many instances, regulation encourages wasteful rent seeking behaviour whereby regulated 
individuals and businesses have increased incentives to seek regulatory favouritism through lobbying 
government ministers and officials.26 
 
When regulations restrict entry into markets and interfere with the freedom to engage in voluntary 
exchange and the alteration of property rights, they unduly restrain individuals from discovering 
new opportunities to create wealth and jobs, and accordingly reduce economic freedom. 
 
2.4.1 Indicator 4A: Number of pages of primary legislation passed or assented 
 
A common, albeit imperfect, measure of regulatory burden is the number of pages of legislation 
passed during a period of time.27 Drawing upon commonwealth and state legislation websites, it is 
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 Productivity Commission, 2007, Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation, Research 
Report, Melbourne. 
24
 Bruce L Benson, 2004, 'Opportunities Foregone: The Unmeasurable Costs of Regulation', The Journal of 
Private Enterprise 19 (2): 1-25. 
25
 Robert Higgs, 1997, 'Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Why Prosperity 
Resumed after the War', The Independent Review 1 (4): 561-590. 
26
 Tullock, Gordon, 1967, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft’, Western Economic Journal 5: 
224-232; Krueger, Anne O, 1974, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, The American Economic 
Review 64: 291-303. 
27
 There is no necessarily unambiguous relationship between the number of pages of legislation and the 
number and extent of regulatory obligations that economic agents need to comply with. In addition, 
comparability of the number of pages of primary legislation passed or assented is compromised by the manner 
in which Acts are published. Mulligan and Schleifer suggest that the estimation of the number of kilobytes of 
unannotated legislation may be a feasible alternative measure of the extent of the regulatory burden. While 
this approach would control for variations in legislative publication standards, this approach has not been 
pursued for this study. See Mulligan, Casey B and Schleifer, Andrei, 2003, ‘Population and Regulation’, Working 
Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=485722. 
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possible to obtain a time series of the number of pages of primary legislation for each calendar 
year.28 
 
Data concerning pages of local laws for Australian local governments are unavailable for most local 
government authorities, or are presented in an inconsistent manner for those (typically 
metropolitan councils) that present such information. Therefore, local government information was 
excluded from this indicator. 
 
The quantum of primary legislation pages for the commonwealth are equally attributed to each 
state, on the basis that commonwealth regulations are applicable across Australia regardless of 
location. To this is added the number of pages of state primary legislation to provide a total for each 
jurisdiction. 
 
The greater the numbers of pages of primary legislation passed by a given jurisdiction, the lower the 
economic freedom score of that jurisdiction. 
 
2.4.2 Indicator 4B: Number of pages of subordinate legislation passed or assented 
 
Australian governments also impose a range of subordinate legislation, providing further 
specification of regulatory conditions in accordance with the objectives stated in primary legislation. 
A larger volume of subordinate legislation passed implies further restrictions upon relative economic 
freedoms. 
 
A count of the number of pages of subordinate legislation passed or assented in each calendar year 
by federal and state parliaments was undertaken. Consistent information on local government 
subordinate legislation is unavailable, and therefore is not included in this study. 
 
Similar to the techniques used to estimate the quantum of primary legislation, subordinate 
legislation pages for the commonwealth are equally attributed to each state, on the basis that 
commonwealth regulations equally apply across the country. To this is added the number of pages 
of state subordinate legislation to provide a total for each jurisdiction. 
 
The estimated number of pages of subordinate legislation passed is not an exhaustive count, as it 
excludes notices, determinations, rulings, proclamations, instruments, orders, codes, declarations, 
guidelines, standards and other forms of ʻgrey letterʼ law. 
 
The greater the numbers of pages of subordinate legislation passed by a given jurisdiction, the lower 
the economic freedom score of that jurisdiction. 
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 The estimates used in this paper represent a ʻgrossʼ count of legislation, in that it incorporates new, 
amended and repealed legislation. 
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2.4.3 Indicator 4C: Number of pages of primary and subordinate legislation per 
legislative item 
 
The complexity of regulation also has important implications for economic freedom, with 
increasingly complex regulatory settings infringing upon the ability of individuals and enterprises to 
engage in productive activities. 
 
A proxy measure for the extent of regulatory complexity is the average number of pages of primary 
and subordinate legislation per legislative instrument (specifically, Acts and regulations).29 This 
measure was estimated for the commonwealth and states using the pages count for indicators 3A 
and 3B, as noted above, and data on the number of Acts and regulations passed each calendar year. 
 
The number of commonwealth primary and subordinate legislation pages, per instrument, was 
equally apportioned to each state. To this is added the number of pages per instrument to provide a 
total for each jurisdiction. 
 
The greater the numbers of pages of subordinate legislation, per legislative item, passed by a given 
jurisdiction, the lower the economic freedom score of that jurisdiction. 
 
Additional statistical information used to derive the index scores is provided in Appendix A. 
 
                                                          
29
 This analysis does not incorporate other measures which explicitly account for the ʻqualityʼ of regulation 
imposed by governments. 
January 2014  Institute of Public Affairs 19 
 
3 Economic freedom index results and analysis 
 
3.1 Index results 
 
Using the methodology outlined in the previous section, it is possible to derive an economic freedom 
index for the six Australian states, for 2011. The overall index reflects the weighted average of values 
for the component areas of government expenditures, taxation and debt, government dependency, 
and the regulatory environment. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of index values for overall economic freedom for each jurisdiction. 
Western Australia is assessed to have been the relatively most economically free jurisdiction in 
Australia in 2011.30 WA was followed by New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, Queensland 
and, finally, Tasmania as the relatively least free jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of Australian economic freedom rankings, 2011 
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Economic freedom index score
 
The formula used to calculate index values is: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) x 10. Vmax is the largest value found 
within the indicator component, Vmin is the smallest, and Vi is the observation to be transformed. 
 
Further information on the components informing the derivation of the overall economic freedom 
index values is provided in Appendix A. The raw data used in the calculation of indicators is provided 
in Appendix B.  
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 Statistical testing for the presence of an outlier (viz. Western Australia) among the economic freedom index 
scores was undertaken. The result of the Grubbsʼ (extreme studentised deviate) test indicated that WA was 
not a significant outlier. 
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3.2 What explains the index results? 
 
Despite a relatively heavy fiscal burden posed by commonwealth, state and local taxes and debts, 
Western Australia has been ranked as the relatively freest jurisdiction in Australia. This finding was 
established on the basis of the stateʼs markedly lower government spending and dependency rates. 
 
New South Wales was assessed as the second freest Australian state, due to relatively low 
government spending and dependency upon governments for incomes. However, there is some 
room for improvement to lower taxes and public debts as well as the annual flow of legislation. 
 
Victoria was ranked as the third freest jurisdiction in relative economic freedom terms. This state 
ranked relatively highly with regard to government expenditure and government dependency 
categories. However, relatively high taxes and a high rate of legislative passage reduced the overall 
relatively economic freedom score for the state. 
 
Victoria was followed by South Australia on the economic freedom ʻleague table.ʼ The state passed a 
small share of the total legislation passed in Australia in 2011, and was ranked in the middle with 
regard to the burden of taxation and debt. However, relatively high levels of government spending 
and dependency compromised South Australiaʼs ability to improve its freedom ranking. 
 
In 2011 Queensland was the second lowest rated state with regard to the Australian economic 
freedom rankings. The state rated well against other jurisdictions in terms of maintaining a relatively 
lower tax and debt burden, and smaller degree of personal income dependency upon government. 
This was more than offset by the highest rate of passage of legislation of all the states (suggestive of 
regulatory activism by policymakers), and a somewhat high level of government consumption 
expenditure. 
 
Tasmania was ranked as the relatively least free state in the Australian federation. Low rates of 
legislation enactment and taxes-debt represented positive attributes of Tasmaniaʼs performance. 
However, high rates of government dependency and public sector spending have posed as 
significant factors weighing down the stateʼs ability to provide an economically free environment to 
work and invest. 
 
3.3 The effect of economic freedom on economic performance 
 
A voluminous literature has emerged over the past two decades, or so, alluding to the beneficial 
effects of relatively greater economic freedom on aspects of economic performance. A catalogue of 
academic research alluding to the beneficial effects of economic freedom can be found at the Fraser 
Institute economic freedom website.31 
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In this section, a ‘fixed effects’ pooled least squares regression analysis is undertaken of the 
relationship between the change in GSP per capita and the change in the economic freedom index, 
from 2001 to 2011.32 The annual change in GSP per capita of the states (gsppc) is used as the 
dependent variable, whereas the annual change in the economic freedom index (free) represents 
one of the independent variables. 
 
Other variables, such as changes in the share of private gross fixed capital formation (less dwellings 
expenditure and ownership transfer costs) to GDP (prinv) and in senior secondary schooling 
apparent retention rates (edu), were also included in the regression. These variables are employed 
to account for the widely held hypotheses that economic growth is influenced by the accumulation 
of physical and human capital.  
 
The unemployment rate in each state (unem) is included in the regression analysis, to account for 
the possibility that annual changes in GSP per capita are affected by fluctuations in the business 
cycle. A time trend variable is also included. All variables have been expressed in natural logarithms, 
so that first differences approximate their growth rates. 
 
The results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 1. The sign of the coefficient for the 
economic freedom variable accorded with a priori expectations, and was found to be statistically 
significant at the five per cent level. The value of the coefficient suggests a ten percentage point 
increase in the economic freedom index increases the growth rate of Australian GSP per capita by 
about 0.2 per cent. 
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 Fixed effects estimation, in this case, is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity between the states 
which are time invariant. 
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Table 1: Results of regression analysis 
Dependent variable: gsppc (growth in GSP per capita) 
 
Independent variables Variable 
description 
Coefficient value p-value 
free Change in economic 
freedom index 
value 
0.023857*** 0.0066 
prinv Change in private 
investment to GSP 
ratio 
0.019413*** 0.0034 
edu Change in senior 
secondary schooling 
apparent retention 
rate 
0.057474** 0.0212 
unem Change in 
unemployment rate 
-0.058213*** 0.0000 
constant Intercept term 0.027630*** 0.0000 
 
Total pool (balanced) 
observations 
60 
Adjusted R-squared 0.770234 
F statistic 20.77828 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.293803 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level. ** Statistically significant at 5% level. * Statistically significant at 10% 
level. Coefficient of the trend variable is not reported in this Table. Cross-section weights and cross-section 
SUR (PSCE) standard errors applied. 
 
Admittedly the regression results are indicative by nature, given that only 60 observations are 
utilised in the pooled regression. As additional data becomes available over time, additional 
empirical investigations into the growth implications of economic freedom for Australia will be 
conducted. 
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4 The importance of economic freedom in a globalised world (Wolfgang 
Kasper)33 
 
4.1 Secure property and discovery 
 
‘Freedom,’ wrote Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant in a letter to a correspondent, ‘is special because 
it brings out the best in people.’ In most circumstances, freedom indeed promotes and buttresses other 
universally accepted, fundamental values that define the good society - peace, justice, equity, security, 
the conservation of a liveable environment and prosperity. These are abstract, high-level aspirations, the 
measuring rods by which we normally judge the quality of social and political life. In policy debates, they 
serve as the ‘ultimate stopping points:’ When it can be shown that a particular policy violates this 
constellation of objectives, public debate ought to stop, for who would argue for injustice, strife or 
material misery? 
 
Wise evaluation of proposed policies of course takes into account that trade-offs and conflicts exist 
between these fundamental objectives. Populists, who single out just one fundamental objective, in 
reality advocate the costly neglect of all others. Their policies sooner or later make costly policy reversals 
inevitable. For example, the pursuit of nature conservation at the expense of all other objectives will 
destroy freedom, security and material well-being. Within the constellation of fundamental values, 
freedom holds a special place – as Locke, Voltaire, Kant and other great minds, who built the intellectual 
foundation of the modern age, fully appreciated. It is complementary to all the other fundamental values 
most of the time, at least over the longer term. 
 
Economic freedom is a key component in overall freedom. It covers secure individual property rights, as 
long as these have been lawfully acquired, and their free, unfettered use within the rule of law. In other 
words, it is the freedom to exercise one’s property rights without hindrance, as long as this does not 
harm the rights of others34. Property is thus not the mere physical possession of an asset. Rather, rightful 
ownership establishes an open-ended bundle of rights, some of which may not be exercised or may not 
even have been discovered yet.35 Property rights can of course be established not only in things, such as 
land and capital goods, but also in ideas (intellectual property) and one’s own labour and skills. 
                                                          
33
 It is intended that each edition of the IPA economic freedom index will include a ʻguest chapterʼ written by a 
prominent Australian academic, or other figure, with expertise in economic freedom issues. Given his 
substantial expertise in the field, the IPA selected the first of these to be prepared by Wolfgang Kasper, 
emeritus Professor of Economics, University of New South Wales, Australia. Wolfgang Kasper thanks Julie 
Novak, John Roskam and Alan Moran for comments on a draft version of this chapter, and retains exclusive 
responsibility for judgments and errors. 
34
 In a genuinely free economy, the party claiming harm has to prove in court that someone else’s property use 
has indeed caused what is defined by the laws of the land as harm. Mere assertions or allegations do not 
suffice. Also note that contemporary legislation often reverses the burden of proof, for example obliging 
property owners to prove that they do not harm the environment. Such reversals of the burden of proof 
deprive rightful owners of some of their rights and amount to an abridgement of a traditional core element of 
procedural justice, the presumption of innocence. 
35
 Wolfgang Kasper, Manfred E Streit, and Peter J Boettke, 2012, Institutional Economics: Property, 
Competition, Policies, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, p. 185-218. 
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Property can be used passively and actively. Thus, a landowner may use his property passively by 
excluding everyone else from using his land. Another may make active use of the land by planting crops, 
but may also grant a right of way to a neighbour and sell the right to hunt to yet other parties. As 
circumstances change, he may sell a mineral exploration right to a company, or discover that he can 
profit from selling certain usage rights to a developer who plans a tourist venture. Indeed, humanity’s 
economic history can be seen as the accumulation of many millions of such discoveries of property-right 
uses and their combination with the property rights of others through voluntary contracts. 
 
Little wealth is created when individual property rights are not protected or when the freedom of 
contract concerning property uses is severely curtailed.36 Why plant a crop when everyone can 
appropriate the yield? Why cultivate a herd when everyone can slaughter the animals? Why risk mineral 
exploration, when governments inhibit the combination of exploration rights with someone else’s 
expertise, labour and capital? Wealth and job creation thus depend on a framework of the right kind of 
rules, which we call ‘institutions’ that protect property and its uses.37 
 
Property is normally protected by shared habits and customs, because everyone realises that theft and 
plunder produce general poverty. Thieves are thus punished spontaneously by members of society, for 
example by reprimand, retaliation and ostracism. We call rules, which evolve within society on the basis 
of experience and which are spontaneously enforced, ‘internal institutions’. Only when private property 
was widely respected and protected, could the human race embark on wealth creation.38 Property was 
the very basis of the ‘Neolithic revolution’ – the gradual transition from mere nature exploitation by 
hunter-gatherers to wealth creation by agriculturalists and pastoralists. This, arguably the most 
important of all revolutions in history, first occurred in upper Mesopotamia some twelve millennia ago, 
when wheat, olives and grapes were first cultivated. Later, property rights and farming were discovered 
independently in north-eastern Thailand (rice), New Guinea (tubers, bananas), Central and South 
America (maize, beans, potatoes). 
 
Using property costs resources: Passive ownership may require the installation of locks, fences, land-titles 
registries, Neighbourhood Watch, or computer codes (exclusion costs); active property uses inflict 
numerous costs, for example searching for potential contract partners who may want to combine their 
property rights with some of yours, or the costs of negotiating and monitoring contract fulfilment and 
resolving conflicts over contract fulfilment (transaction costs). 
 
To begin with, private property was respected and, if necessary, spontaneously protected in small 
groups, so that all could prosper.39 This is how the law emerged long before there were governments. As 
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Friedrich Hayek remarked in his famous work Law, Legislation and Liberty: ‘Law is older than 
legislation.’40 Over time, these internal institutions were frequently reinforced by authorities, which 
emerged in the wake of the Neolithic revolution: priests, kings, and magistrates. Certain individuals or 
groups claimed political powers to codify, clarify and enforce existing customs, often claiming the 
monopoly to use violence. Hammurabi (1727-1686 BC) in Mesopotamia and Moses (ca. 1225 BC) in 
Palestine were such lawgivers. 
 
In the literature, formal rules, which are laid down and enforced by political leaders, are called ‘external 
institutions’. People accepted political authority and formal rules because most experienced greater 
security, were able to produce more, survived in greater numbers and were able to discover new uses of 
what they owned. Reliably enforced institutions are particularly important for the search of knowledge 
about new, untested property uses, which is always risky. After all, costs have to be incurred in 
knowledge search first, before it can be known whether the knowledge is at all useful. Will a costly new 
oil well produce a bonanza, or yet another disappointment? Will a new product find a market? 
 
The competitive market economy is a daily process of evolution by intelligent human selection. It 
frequently also inflicts costly losses on would-be innovators. Risking (often massive) knowledge-search 
costs therefore requires a spirit of enterprise and a high degree of confidence that hoped-for rewards will 
not be taken away. This is why a framework of known, reliable rules that establish secure property rights 
is essential to innovation and hence material progress. If successful innovators must fear nationalisation 
or face ‘super-profit taxes’, they will be disinclined to risk their scarce resources to search for new uses of 
their assets, skills and knowledge. The poor protection of private property rights explains why so little 
technical and material progress occurred during most of history and why many societies still remain 
poor.41 This is not obscure economic theory, but straightforward common sense. 
 
Our present-day external (government-made) institutions are normally the hard-won outcome of 
political trials and errors. Political and economic agents may have struggled to resolve bitter conflicts and 
learnt from bitter experiences – only think of Western rules of religious tolerance that were forged during 
centuries of religious strife. Such institutions, anchored in shared values, constitute a society’s most 
valuable asset in promoting people’s fundamental aspirations: They reduce transaction costs (enhancing 
competitiveness and prosperity), avert or mitigate conflicts (promoting justice, peace and security) and 
promote individual autonomy (supporting freedom and prosperity). Since good institutions raise 
everyone’s productivity potential, one is justified to call a society’s rule system its ‘institutional capital’. 
Those who have no first-hand experience of other, less successful societies may be unaware just what 
precious possession time-tested, shared institutions are! 
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4.2 Economic freedom, prosperity, political and civil freedom - A virtuous circle 
 
Economic freedom is not only a crucial component in overall freedom, but – as has been repeatedly the 
case – is also the foundation, on which civic and political liberties are subsequently built. The merchants 
and craftsmen of the trading cities of post-Medieval Europe were offered economic (and sometimes 
religious) freedom by feudal rulers long before the emergence of democracy and acceptance of most of 
the general civil liberties we now take for granted.42 Some rulers even allowed traders to create their 
own laws and courts, so that they could rely on their own, self-created rules. These became known as 
‘Law Merchant’ (lex mercatoria). Merchants no longer depended on the often corrupt, tardy and biased 
courts of the kings. The rulers, who self-constrained their own opportunism in these ways, did so of 
course not out of deep philosophical insights or empathy with the oppressed, but to attract wealth-
creating, tax-paying merchants and craftsmen. 
 
Gradually, a relatively free middle class emerged who demanded overall freedom and constitutional 
government. It was achieved by the ‘citizens of property,’ who had the wherewithal to obtain civic and 
political liberties. Paupers could not have attained this on their own. In the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the prospering inhabitants of North America and Australasia also secured decent 
levels of overall freedom. Formally protected property rights and capitalism thus became the trailblazers 
of modern democracy.43 
 
Since the 1960s, a similar dynamic has been unfolding in East Asia. Small, insecure autocracies on Asia’s 
fringe enhanced economic freedom and implemented rule-bound administrations to attract 
internationally mobile capital, knowledge and multinational enterprises to promote economic 
development. They offered tax concessions and made land and infrastructures cheaply available. The 
autocrats of the emerging ‘Asian Tiger’ countries were after greater prosperity, a bigger tax take and 
improved security, but the unintended by-product was the rapid rise of a middle class that agitated for 
greater political and civil freedom. The process has since spread throughout East Asia, even into China. 
 
4.3 Freedom and the Jekyll-and-Hyde nature of government 
 
Economic freedom has by now been improved in many parts of the world, but it is far from secure.44 
Over recent years, we have had to witness instances of costly backsliding in rich and poor countries alike. 
One therefore has to ask: Is economic freedom endangered by (a) powerful fellow citizens, for example 
criminals, monopolies and cartels, or (b) government bodies with coercive powers? 
 
As mentioned, government originally came about because ordinary people wanted protection from 
opportunistic fellow citizens, thugs, fraudsters, foreign aggressors and the like, and political agents 
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provided helpful external institutions. Meantime, shared and reliably enforced institutions have become 
central to the productive and peaceful cooperation among the many. 
 
Our high living standards now depend on an almost invisible spider web of institutions that support this 
cooperation. The division of labour and innovation have increased in previously unimaginable ways. 
Production has also shifted increasingly from primary and secondary industries to services, where the 
right rules of the game matter even more. As a consequence of these trends, the costs of transacting 
business have risen steeply to nowadays more than half of all costs of producing and distributing the 
national product. 
 
But not all rule systems are of equal usefulness in ordering the complex cooperation in the economy, 
hence in setting the level of transaction costs. If the rules become confusing and are poorly enforced, 
transaction costs soar. The static and dynamic efficiency of the economy then suffers, and the production 
of many goods and services no longer promises a profit. Lines of production are then discontinued; plants 
are closed. It is then all too easy for politicians and union leaders to blame ‘the high dollar’ or ‘unfair 
overseas competition;’ few think of artificially high government- and union-made transaction costs. 
 
Governments thus have great influence over transaction costs. If they concentrate on protecting life, limb 
and property (protective function of government) and do so in steady, transparent ways, the transaction 
costs of coordinating people’s business will remain low and the agency costs, which governments incur 
for providing protection and which they have to finance by taxes, will also remain low. 
 
The ruling elites, however, often exceed what is necessary for protection and then pose immediate 
dangers to individual freedom and property. The rulers and ‘violence professionals’ have frequently used 
their powers against the very citizens and their property, which they were meant to protect. After all, 
they are like all humans: opportunistic and easily corrupted by power. When ruling elites reject codes 
that bind them, they replace the rule of law with kleptocracy and the arbitrary misrule of men. Why not 
plunder more to expand the size of the ruling class and enhance its living standards at the expense of 
ordinary folk? Why not confiscate or decree ‘haircuts’ for bank depositors and superannuation savers to 
shore up failing political strategies? Why not seek bribes from affluent individuals in exchange for political 
favours? Why not elbow private initiative aside to produce goods and services in government-owned and 
bureaucrat-run monopolies (expanding productive government)?45 
 
Officials have long been adept at monopolising production activities that promise easy revenue – from 
the salt and tobacco monopolies of yesteryear to broadband socialisation today. As most government 
activities are run along administrative lines and without the promise of a profit commensurate to risk-
taking, they often consume more resources than what value they create (not value-adding, but value 
destruction). As governments grew and became more complex, expert bureaucrats frequently made 
themselves the real masters of government. The bureaucracy is now often able to self-promote itself, 
inflating staff numbers and upgrading job classifications (‘classification creep’). Tenured bureaucrats 
nowadays often take decisions that suit them, and elected politicians serve as mere front men to be 
blamed when things go wrong. 
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Like no other system of government, electoral democracy has opened an additional avenue for 
expanding the government’s share in the economy: Why not confiscate the property rights of some and 
redistribute them to others to buy popular support and re-election? When the government’s visible hand 
‘corrects’ the distribution of incomes and wealth which results from competitive market activity 
(redistributive government), this is of course in direct conflict with the government’s primary protective 
function. It cannot at the same time be a credible protector of private property and a major confiscator 
and redistributor thereof!46 
 
From the beginning, government has thus had a Jekyll-and-Hyde character: Ever since the Neolithic 
revolution, mankind has had to live with the blessing of protective government and the curse of excessive 
productive and redistributive government. This moved Edmund Burke to lament: ‘The Thing! The Thing 
itself is the abuse!’ 
 
In the face of this moral dilemma, it is tempting to deny the problem altogether by assuming that the 
rulers and their agents are benevolent. The public-choice school of economics, as well as worldwide 
experiences, have shown how unrealistic it is to assume that selfish ordinary people become selfless 
knights in shining armour when entrusted with public office.47 Alternatively, some consider government 
an unmitigated evil and advocate anarchy. This is a cheap, escapist cop-out. While fine theories have 
been formulated to show that all human coordination in a complex macro society might be possible 
without any recourse to collective action and governance, the reality is that such a utopia has never been 
realised in practice. Even in the small community that the Bounty mutineers set up on Pitcairn Island, 
murder and mayhem were terminated only when a para-political authority was created. 
 
Alas, mankind is condemned to live with the mixed blessing of government. Analysing its size and 
functions in the best interests of all citizens should therefore be the core task of all social science, 
including economics: Under what private and political institutions can ignorant, fallible, forgetful, lazy, 
opportunistic producers and buyers cooperate to generate the best material welfare for everyone? The 
real task is to think hard about what functions need to be entrusted to government and how government 
authorities can be kept from overstepping the mark. Moreover, as circumstances evolve, the role and 
size of government has to be re-examined time and again. Rule systems must therefore not be allowed to 
rigidify, even if the old rules protect those who have attained advantageous socio-economic positions 
and wish to employ established institutions to conserve them. It is one of the essential lessons of history 
that institutional rigidity paves the way for the decline and fall of civilisations. Like a mother’s job, the 
task of cultivating freedom-supporting rule systems is therefore never quite done. 
 
4.4 Globalisation gives primacy to markets and institutional creativity 
 
The broad sweep of history shows that the gradual improvement of private property rights and their free 
use has been central to the initially slow, then accelerating rise of productivity and living standards, first 
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in the West and in recent decades in many places beyond. From the late eighteenth century onwards, 
new technologies and new ways of productive cooperation between owners of capital, skills and 
knowledge gave rise to the industrial revolution. Since then, we have seen wave upon wave of 
innovation, the emergence of new industrial countries and prospering, freer communities. Enormous 
improvements in transport and communications have helped to spread modern industry and commerce, 
to exploit scale economies and to ensure that markets transcend national borders. The communications 
revolution of the past half-century has promoted the ‘transport of ideas’ around the globe. And the ideas 
that have had most impact in previously remote corners relate to the rules how best to use property 
rights. Institutional innovation has improved the ‘software of development’, which allows people to draw 
greater benefit from the ‘hardware of development’ – their labour, skills, capital goods, technical 
knowledge and natural resources. 
 
Globalisation is reflected in a huge increase in international factor mobility. It has been more important 
than trade in forcing official rule makers to overcome their usual cognitive barriers and enhance the rules 
so that they become more advantageous to the citizens’ wealth.48 As tightly knit, smoothly functioning 
exchange networks and multinationals operate across national borders, business people now make 
regular locational choices between different jurisdictions. Industry location is now decided primarily by 
where the local, immobile production factors support profitable production.49 Footloose owners of 
internationally mobile knowledge, capital and firms shop around to combine with the most 
advantageous immobile production factors – land, labour, which is often organised by unions, work 
practices, and government-provided rule systems. Yes, government administration is a production factor! 
Those politicians and bureaucrats, who produce reliable, easily-understood rules and enforce them 
reliably and expediently, raise the productivity of all other production factors, as we saw above. On the 
other hand, cumbersome and corrupt government administrations that hamper the expedient 
combination of property rights and make knowledge search more risky, are nowadays readily shunned. 
 
To give an example, rigidities in Australian labour markets and work practices have prevented Pilbara 
ores and Queensland coal to be processed into steel for world markets in an Australian location, because 
capital-intensive steelworks have to work reliably 24/7. As never before, the need to attract and retain 
mobile capital, knowledge and enterprises is of course an irritant to vested interests. Local landowners, 
union leaders and government agents often resent that they can no longer extract monopoly rents and 
have to incur the transaction costs of competing. Some of them therefore insist on the ‘primacy of 
politics’ over free private choices in markets.50 Entrenched, self-seeking political and union elites may not 
even comprehend that globalisation now forces unions and government administrators to compete 
internationally. Institutional reform therefore often has to wait till a younger generation of political 
entrepreneurs replaces the ancien régime, offering reform programs. 
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All too often, political establishments seek salvation from the need to compete with other governments 
and unions by creating transnational governance networks, in reality cartels of political powerbrokers. 
Australians should take note of European Union’s ‘rulers’ and regulators’ cartel' and its consequences – 
growing popular resentment and the rejection of democratic politics by large sections of the electorate. 
As the growing density of ill-understood EU regulations has raised the transaction costs of making active 
uses of property, Europe’s capital owners now frequently confine themselves to passive uses of their 
property – a key factor why ‘Old Europe’s’ economic performance disappoints. 
 
Transnational polit-cartels also disenfranchise citizens elsewhere. In an attempt to outflank globe-
spanning market networks and avoid interjurisdictional competition, national governments have formed 
cartels, such as the G-5, G-8 and G-20 groups, with which the Australian government eagerly cooperates. 
Advocates of world government are trying to shift political decision-making powers to distant UN bodies. 
They praise political cartelisation as ‘harmonisation,’ lambast political competition as ‘social dumping’ 
and a ‘race to the lowest common denominator,’ and brand business-friendly institutional innovations by 
national governments as signs of political disloyalty. But all these deals erode national sovereignty and 
abridge the decision-making powers and responsibilities of elected parliaments.51 Most importantly, they 
prevent the competitive discovery of possibly new and productive institutional innovations. 
Conservatives may applaud; genuine classical liberals and protagonists of growth and job creation are 
horrified. 
 
The desire for a protected, cosy market niche or a monopoly – whether in business or government – is 
understandable. It preserves established socio-economic positions and averts the need for costly and 
risky knowledge searches. But, to repeat, it is bad for the wealth of nations! Competition – whether 
economic rivalry for market share and political rivalry in creating attractive institutions – serves important 
socio-political purposes.52 It keeps social structures robust and can thus prevent the decline of entire 
economies and civilisations. Competition should therefore be considered a public good of the highest 
order.53 
 
The question for Australia’s political and administrative leaders is whether to emulate the princes of the 
small European jurisdictions, who constrained their powers and rivalled with their counterparts to attract 
wealth-creating merchants and industrialists, or to pursue the inward-looking power games of Ming and 
Ch’ing dynasty China, Habsburg-Burbón Spain and the late Ottoman Empire.54 These regulation-tortured 
economies stagnated and declined. Eventually, the political regimes fell. Australians would to my mind be 
well advised to make the ‘location Australia’ as internationally attractive as possible, similar to what the 
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officials of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan did a generation ago, when they streamlined 
business approval procedures, opened one-stop shops for investors, abolished price regulations, 
liberalised markets for capital and labour, created expedient commercial courts, and made 
macroeconomic stability a top priority. Since 1980, Australian governments have taken many steps in the 
right direction – and the outcome has been as expected: a more robust economy. However, the lure of 
political power and rent-seeking is never far away. Inner circles of powerbrokers and coteries of faceless 
men (and women) can be ruthless in avoiding political competition and clever in pretending that they 
only act ‘in the national interest.’ 
 
4.5 Universal rules help wealth creation 
 
Politicians and administrators, who want to promote microeconomic reforms in order to win the 
interjurisdictional competition, can find guidance in long-term economic history and legal-economic 
analysis. These sources show that institutions aimed at securing economic freedom and attracting 
internationally mobile job and wealth creators, must have the following qualities: 
 
 The rules must be general and abstract, i.e. they must not be case-specific and must not discriminate 
between different individuals and industries.55 Keep the tax code non-discriminatory, avoid 
industry-specific subsidies and resist dishing out favours to political cronies! 
 The rules must be simple and certain. Simple laws are readily understood; and the consequences of 
rule violations can be clearly known if consistently and expediently enforced. Simplify the tax code 
and development approvals! Give businesspeople consistent and unconditional replies to their 
inquiries and ensure that regulators and courts act promptly. Avoid all ad hocery! Do not change the 
ground rules after every election! 
 The rules must be open, i.e. they must always offer guidance in future eventualities. Owners of 
property rights must be able to make spontaneous, confident decisions, because the laws apply to 
the future as they did in the past. When new market opportunities beckon, entrepreneurs cannot 
wait until government committees come up with new rule books. 
 Finally, the rule system must be coherent and non-contradictory. A logical order among individual 
rules makes the institutional system more effective. The institutions are much less effective if, for 
example, business can operate freely in product and capital markets, but faced numerous restrictions 
in labour markets, as was for example the norm in Australia in the late 1980s and is now again the 
case. 
 
These institutional qualities are described in the literature as ‘universality.’ It enhances freedom and 
makes rule compliance and hence governance easier.56 Institutional systems that embody these universal 
qualities are neither conducive to license, not do they lead to a ‘race to the bottom.’ Instead, they signal a 
commitment to what should be the primary objective of government, protecting life, limb and property. 
A universal rule system creates confidence, lowers the transaction costs of doing business and 
encourages owners to commit their resources to knowledge search. It fosters structural flexibility in 
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industry and underpins a robust economy.57 A universal order is therefore good for international 
competitiveness, as well as economic growth, security, justice and internal peace 
 
4.6 Competitive federalism is creative and citizen-friendly 
 
Interjurisdictional competition should not be confined to the international sphere. It can be of great and 
lasting benefit if applied within nations. In federations, many domains of governance should be entrusted 
to the states, and within states to local governments. That such subsidiarity can be of long-term benefit 
becomes evident when one examines most of the successful, durably prospering, free democracies, 
Many are genuine federations, for example the United States of America, Australia, Germany, Canada 
and Switzerland.58 Many, traditionally unitary nations have in recent decades also decentralised, for 
example Spain, the United Kingdom, France, India and Indonesia. 
 
How should a federal system be designed to promote institutional discovery procedures and empower 
the citizens? The following elements constitute the essentials of competitive federalism: 
 
 Subsidiarity: Political and administrative decision making is delegated to the lowest possible level of 
government, so that collective choices are made by political and administrative agents who are as 
close as possible to the communities they are meant to serve. Collective decisions will then be better 
informed by what happens on the ground, and decision makers will be critically monitored by 
concerned citizens. Decisions can then be tailored to diverse local conditions, and different states 
may try different strategies to deliver services. Eventually, the best method will win. Alas, we often 
observe a drift of decision powers further and further away from local communities to more distant, 
less accountable authorities. 
 Rule of origin: Any good or service that is produced legally in one part of the federation must be 
automatically admitted for sale in all parts of the federation. In other words, untrammelled free 
trade between states must be guaranteed. 
 Exclusivity: Each task of government is assigned exclusively to one level of government. Overlaps and 
duplications only cause costly bureaucratic turf wars and counterproductive blame games. The 
voters must always know which government bodies and which elected politicians are responsible for 
delivering a particular service. For example, there should be only one department for health or 
education, either at the federal or the state level. COAG meetings will then no longer be about blame 
games for failing hospitals or schools. 
 Fiscal equivalence: Each government should be exclusively responsible for financing the tasks that is 
has been assigned or has volunteered to fulfil. Equivalence balances public spending schemes with 
the opprobrium for raising taxes. This would put a brake on the relentless growth of public 
expenditures. When vertical and horizontal transfers of funds are banned (or at least strictly limited), 
politicians and administrators can undertake spending programs only if these can be financed by 
taxes and fees levied in their own jurisdiction or by borrowing. Most politicians and bureaucrats will 
of course be opposed, especially in notoriously mendicant states. Fiscal equivalence will also do away 
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with politically motivated, often arbitrary and invariably disruptive changes in the Grants 
Commission‘s distribution of the (now federally levied) GST. Equivalence will thus promote 
universality in the rules governing federal-state relations: States will be able to plan ahead with more 
certainty and feel less subservient to Canberra Centre.59 The various governments should be fairly 
free how to design their tax regimes. 
 Prohibition of subsidy wars: A constitutional rule must proscribe the use of taxes or funds borrowed 
by state governments to bribe mobile producers with subsidies to attract them away from other 
states. If a state offers a subsidy to a particular producer, it has to offer the same to all comers. This 
would avoid counterproductive zero-sum games and mounting public debts. This prohibitive rule is 
analogous to the ban of discrimination under the ‘Most Favoured Nations Clause’ in the rulebook on 
international trade.60 
 
Only political activities that bring with them important economies of scale and savings from central 
standardisation should be entrusted to the central government. Under competitive federalism, the 
central government would thus be exclusively responsible for foreign affairs, national defence, monetary 
policy, border protection from illegal immigration, as well as the design and enforcement of standard 
road and air traffic rules and nation-wide public health standards. Matters that have nation-wide external 
effects or involve high costs for operators, who frequently transit from one state to the other, should also 
come under the purview of the central government. Infrastructures of trans-regional importance might 
be a central-government responsibility, while local infrastructures should be the exclusive responsibility 
of state governments. As a consequence, the federal government would have much less to do and could 
therefore perform better with available resources in an era of intensifying taxpayer resistance and 
growing scepticism about the merits of big government. 
 
The various states would design their own business regulations, development policies, public health-care 
and education systems. They would design and implement most environmental, product- and labour-
market regulations and fund most social-welfare policies, always of course within their financial means. 
The states would experiment with a diversity of administrative solutions to collective problems. 
Queensland might, for example, replace the traditional direct funding of schools and hospitals by handing 
vouchers for education and elective surgery to eligible voters and taxpayers. Tasmania might experiment 
with closing down more industries to protect the environment and create ‘green jobs.’ The voters would 
                                                          
59 It must be noted in this context that massive vertical and horizontal transfers are the intergovernmental 
equivalent of the grand social-democratic redistribution experiment of the twentieth century, which has been 
a worldwide failure. Governments of the Left and the Right are now reduce transfer payments and emphasise 
self-reliance. Enhancing fiscal equivalence will be part of this trend to self-reliance. It will ensure that political 
elites and electorates develop a more realistic interest in cultivating their own tax bases by growing their 
economies. The massive federal-state transfer machine in Australia makes it easy for political opportunists to 
oppose to economic growth and rely instead on horizontal or vertical hand-
outs. Kasper et. al., op. cit., p. 352-360. 
60
 This is only a thumbnail sketch of the ground rules of competitive federalism, meant to elicit renewed 
discussion. For more detail see Kasper (1995 and 1996). As of 2013, I would not change anything of substance 
in what I put forward in these two Institute of Public Affairs publications. Kasper, Wolfgang, 1995, Competitive 
Federalism, Promoting Freedom and Prosperity, Institute of Public Affairs, States’ Policy Unit: Perth; Kasper, 
Wolfgang, 1996, Competitive Federalism Revisited: Bidding Wars, or Getting the Fundamentals Right?, Institute 
of Public Affairs, States’ Policy Unit: Perth. 
January 2014  Institute of Public Affairs 34 
 
in each case be able to observe the consequences of these public choices and then vote accordingly. Such 
diversity of course inflicts transaction costs, but over the long-term we would discover the most citizen-
friendly style of government. Citizens would feel empowered and find themselves in the rightful position 
of principals vis-à-vis the agents of government. 
 
In an era when democracies teeter under the weight of popular apathy, rejection and cynicism, this is an 
important consideration. The current situation in the mature democracies reminds students of history of 
how the legitimacy of rulers tends to be undermined by communications revolutions and, when poorly 
handled, ends in costly, protracted conflicts: The Gutenberg communications revolution of the 
Reformation age encouraged sceptical, divergent opinions and fostered the formation of new 
micro-centres of power; eventually, it led to the wars of religion in regimes, which mishandled necessary 
institutional reforms. And the sceptical ideas of the Enlightenment that were promulgated by the new 
medium of the French Encyclopédie led eventually – because ignored by the ruling elites – to the Rule of 
Terror. At the present, the internet again spreads doubts and divergent opinions and creates new power 
alliances. Will the ruling elites realise this time round that they must search for new solutions to problems 
which are turning so many citizens rebellious? 
 
The concept of competitive federalism could become one helpful discovery mechanism, but it is of 
course attacked by political and bureaucratic elites, government-funded ‘non-government’ organisations 
and the media, which sing from the statist songsheet. The arguments against competitive federalism are 
the same that one hears against international political competition: Cooperation is virtuous; competition 
is disloyal and selfish. Competitive federalism is said to unduly constrain the freedom of politicians to act 
in the public interest, however defined. It is also argued that competitive federalism is costly, but no 
policy reform is cost-free. Over the long term, it is more costly to cling rigidly to the old ways. Indeed, all 
arguments that have ever been adduced to defend business monopolies and autocratic governments 
have also surfaced in the debate about competitive federalism. Yet, the fundamental fact remains that 
competition between state and local governments preserves free markets and encourages the widest 
possible creative use of private property.61 
 
Competitive federalism is of course no panacea, but every approximation to it controls officialdom and 
cronyism and gives economic freedom of individual workers and property owners a better chance. 
Competition between state and local governments also strengthens the overall competitive capacity and 
robustness of the ‘location Australia’ in the world at a time when we have to stand our ground in fiercely 
competitive global markets 
 
4.7 Yardsticks educate us about good government 
 
As the world evolves, institutions often have to do the same. From the viewpoint of liberal institutional 
economics, the arguably biggest problem is: How can we ensure that a society’s internal and external 
institutions evolve so that the members of society are best able to pursue their diverse, self-chosen 
purposes? The challenge is less problematic with regard to internal institutions, as they adapt continually 
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in decentralised ways in the light of experiences. External (government-made) institutions are different: 
Many individuals may well know that given external institutions hinder their trade and prevent new uses 
of their property. Yet, political inertia may persist for a variety of causes: The political agents may remain 
ignorant about the benefits of reforming the rules. They may simply not know or not care. They may not 
even care whether they wreck private welfare. They may treat the pleas of mere miners, industrialists, 
builders and merchants with contempt, as they are ideologically biased against profit-making activities. 
They may arrogantly claim political primacy. They may also be influenced (and bankrolled) by vested 
interests with a stake in protecting past socio-economic structures.62 
 
Never underestimate the ignorance of political elites and their advisors! To cite just one example: the 
political-bureaucratic cognition problem was glaringly obvious to many in Australia during the 1970s. Yet, 
the political and industrial elites and the press were wedded to a traditional protectionist-interventionist 
rule set, which was emaciating this country’s growth potential. It took over a decade till the penny 
dropped and some microeconomic reforms were implemented. 
 
Economic openness at least ensures that trade deficits, capital flight and the exodus of businesses signal 
competitive weaknesses caused by inappropriate external rules. Reactionary political, union and industry 
leaders may then still react by shouting: ʻGood riddance!ʼ But the ongoing exodus of owners of capital, 
knowledge and enterprises will eventually change minds, and a new majority of political and bureaucratic 
opinion will emerge. 
 
In the face of political-administrative inertia, much depends on the clarity, with which institutional 
shortcomings can be connected to economic outcomes. Economics Nobel Prize laureate Milton Friedman 
kept telling us that political agents and electorates learn the right lessons faster when the facts can be 
measured and the performance of various external rule systems can be compared. Quantification is 
extremely useful in educating us, for example, about how various administrations help or hinder ordinary 
people in realising their fundamental aspirations, in particular freedom and prosperity. If cause and effect 
are quantified and connexions logically induced from reality, this fosters understanding of what reformed 
institutions and governance practices can achieve. 
 
This is why comparative information about institutional settings in the various states of the Australian 
Commonwealth, as presented in this pioneering volume, will prove invaluable to our understanding of 
how we should shape Australia’s most important asset – our shared institutional infrastructure. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s several economists, including the great twentieth-century 
economist Milton Friedman, were actively involved in a broad project aiming to develop a measure 
of economic freedom. 
 
This project was inspired by the desire to quantify the relationship between economic freedom, 
however quantified, and economic performance, confirming the age-old classical liberal inclination 
that prosperity is synonymous with economic environments that are conducive to personal choice, 
voluntary exchange, freedom to compete in markets, and the protection of people and properties. 
 
Since the early forays into investigating the feasibility of defining and estimating economic freedom, 
numerous studies have flourished that provide comparable inter-country and inter-regional freedom 
indexes. Further, an academic literature has emerged which, in general terms, confirms a positive 
association between economic freedom and dimensions of economic, and even social, performance. 
 
This paper provides the first estimates of economic freedom for the six Australian states, 
complementing international studies that have estimated the relative freedom for Australia as a 
whole against other nations. In so doing, it is hoped that this publication serves as a modest 
contribution to the international economic freedom literature. 
 
In broad terms, the results of this paper indicate that jurisdictions in which governments spend and 
tax less, enact fewer regulations, and have fewer people depending upon the state for their incomes 
will be relatively freer than others. 
 
Across the indicators used to inform the overall development of the economic freedom index, 
Western Australia was found to be the most relatively free jurisdiction in 2011. At the other end of 
the scale, jurisdictions such as Tasmania, Queensland and South Australia, with relatively larger fiscal 
or more frequent regulatory activities undertaken by all levels of government, were the least free in 
relative terms. 
 
It is not implausible to suggest that Australians had benefited substantially from the introduction of 
economic reforms from the early 1980s to the late 1990s. These reforms aimed to reduce the direct 
interference of political actors in economic affairs across a range of factor and product markets, and 
instil a greater sense of policy certainty to inspire private sector confidence to engage in productive 
routines. 
 
However there have been worrying signs of slippage in the broad policy objective to substitute 
collective for private action and decision making in the economic realm. Indeed, some relatively 
minor exceptions aside, the general tendency observed within the Australian federal system over 
the past few years has been a widespread political reticence to engage in reforms reducing the 
extent of governmental interference in economic affairs. 
 
Government expenditures and public sector debts have rapidly escalated, reducing the effective 
field in which private sector economic actions may be undertaken. The extent to which the 
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population has become dependent upon government for their incomes continues to increase, 
courtesy of growth in government bureaucracy and welfare recipients. 
 
All levels of government have imposed economically damaging taxes, including on carbon dioxide 
emissions and mineral commodities, as well as new surcharges on income tax. Finally, the freedom 
of individuals to engage with each other in labour, financial and product markets have been 
progressively restricted through fast growth in regulatory edicts issued by parliaments and 
bureaucracies. 
 
To a certain extent, Australia as retained a favourable position in global economic freedom rankings 
due to the greater eagerness with which some other developed countries, such as the United States, 
have debauched their own freedoms through an enlargement in the relative size and scope of 
government. However, if our own recent trend of complacency concerning the need to retain high 
levels of economic freedom continues, this will lead to progressively fewer opportunities for 
ordinary Australians to improve living standards for themselves and their families. 
 
The relative rankings of the Australian states on the economic freedom index illustrate significant 
variations in the discipline of politicians and bureaucrats around the country to abstain from 
economic activities. As the rankings clearly indicate, not all political actors are equally disciplined to 
allow regional economies to remain free, and therefore not all Australians enjoy the same degree of 
economic freedoms. 
 
Our future prosperity and employment opportunities depend on how well enterprising and 
resourceful Australians are free to explore new economic ideas to satisfy consumers here and 
abroad. The recent Australian tradition of maintaining a relatively high degree of economic freedom 
should be maintained, and all levels of government should pull their weight in an agenda to remove 
restrictions upon the capacity of individuals to exercise their freedoms in the economic realm. 
 
It is hoped that the publication of this index will inspire genuine economic reforms in all states, and 
not just those lagging in the relative economic freedom stakes, thus empowering all individuals with 
greater freedoms to produce, distribute and exchange in the servicing of others. 
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Appendix A 
 
Disaggregated economic freedom index scores, 2011 
 
 Overall index C1 C2 C3 C4 I1A I1B I1C I2A I2B I2C I3A I3B I3C I4A I4B I4C 
 
NSW 
 
 
5.58 
 
6.28 
 
3.27 
 
6.93 
 
5.82 
 
6.74 
 
5.67 
 
6.81 
 
3.57 
 
2.32 
 
4.03 
 
8.08 
 
5.55 
 
6.88 
 
8.69 
 
1.71 
 
7.24 
 
Vic 
 
 
5.02 
 
5.88 
 
2.58 
 
7.29 
 
4.33 
 
5.93 
 
5.59 
 
6.84 
 
4.13 
 
0.15 
 
3.54 
 
10.00 
 
6.30 
 
5.73 
 
6.26 
 
3.68 
 
3.18 
 
Qld 
 
 
3.60 
 
3.66 
 
4.04 
 
6.71 
 
0.00 
 
5.93 
 
4.40 
 
1.01 
 
8.22 
 
4.02 
 
0.00 
 
7.51 
 
6.61 
 
5.62 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
WA 
 
 
8.25 
 
9.90 
 
6.60 
 
9.17 
 
7.34 
 
10.00 
 
10.00 
 
10.00 
 
0.00 
 
10.00 
 
10.00 
 
7.98 
 
10.00 
 
10.00 
 
6.29 
 
7.49 
 
8.46 
 
SA 
 
 
5.00 
 
3.59 
 
3.40 
 
4.21 
 
8.80 
 
4.68 
 
3.68 
 
2.78 
 
9.40 
 
0.00 
 
0.90 
 
5.80 
 
2.52 
 
3.01 
 
9.38 
 
7.27 
 
10.00 
 
Tas 
 
 
3.57 
 
0.00 
 
5.47 
 
0.00 
 
8.81 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
10.00 
 
4.07 
 
2.51 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
10.00 
 
10.00 
 
6.69 
Columns prefixed by letter ‘C’ are for each component. Columns prefixed by letter ‘I’ is for indicators of each component. 
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Appendix B 
 
Economic freedom index score data, 2001 to 2011 
 
Component 1 Size of government 
 
Indicator 1A General government sector final consumption expenditures, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 15.39 15.34 15.43 15.36 15.44 15.57 15.34 15.23 15.92 15.86 16.01 
Vic 16.13 16.12 16.28 15.97 16.12 16.68 16.25 16.32 17.09 17.51 17.63 
Qld 17.39 16.65 16.76 16.72 16.07 15.20 15.35 15.57 15.26 16.62 17.21 
WA 14.85 14.60 14.35 14.02 13.85 12.59 12.26 12.03 11.99 12.62 11.16 
SA 18.51 18.37 17.92 17.77 18.45 18.42 18.50 17.76 19.10 19.45 19.02 
Tas 22.79 22.92 22.30 22.02 22.52 22.83 22.22 22.37 24.73 24.55 25.21 
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, cat. no. 5220.0. 
 
Indicator 1B General government sector subsidy and transfer expenditures, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 18.07 18.83 18.14 18.36 18.32 18.45 18.62 18.75 21.26 21.52 20.13 
Vic 18.02 18.38 17.57 18.23 18.37 18.56 18.64 18.69 21.34 21.35 20.26 
Qld 23.11 22.41 21.79 21.81 21.17 19.99 19.38 19.48 20.66 21.62 22.32 
WA 18.89 18.99 18.38 18.46 18.56 16.65 15.26 14.79 15.31 15.69 12.64 
SA 23.53 23.29 22.58 22.71 23.16 22.78 22.32 22.31 25.36 26.42 23.57 
Tas 29.77 29.84 28.83 27.86 27.86 27.55 25.60 26.34 29.77 29.76 29.93 
Source: ABS, Government Finance Statistics, Australia, cat. no. 5512.0; Commonwealth Budget Papers; Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 
Higher Education Statistics. 
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Indicator 1C General government sector gross fixed capital formation, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 2.55 2.52 2.60 2.48 2.53 2.69 2.70 2.80 3.03 3.51 3.30 
Vic 2.33 2.55 2.66 2.34 2.36 2.66 2.47 2.45 2.90 3.49 3.29 
Qld 4.41 3.94 3.32 3.32 3.56 3.45 3.82 4.26 4.85 5.90 5.11 
WA 2.89 2.55 2.20 2.33 2.47 2.28 2.21 2.55 2.36 2.86 2.30 
SA 2.79 2.72 2.84 2.58 2.89 3.01 2.86 3.01 3.81 4.91 4.56 
Tas 3.47 3.55 3.50 3.04 3.70 3.94 3.09 3.42 4.04 4.97 5.43 
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, cat. no. 5220.0. 
 
Component 2 Taxation and debt 
 
Indicator 2A General government sector direct taxation, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 18.07 17.42 17.80 18.00 18.60 18.60 18.11 18.20 17.05 15.74 15.89 
Vic 18.99 17.58 17.83 18.06 18.85 18.79 18.39 18.14 16.80 15.59 15.67 
Qld 17.02 15.91 16.92 16.90 17.53 17.52 16.97 17.04 15.64 14.07 14.11 
WA 19.70 17.39 18.32 18.63 20.03 20.58 20.76 21.04 18.67 17.13 17.25 
SA 17.25 16.30 16.84 16.67 17.53 17.49 16.77 16.22 14.87 13.82 13.65 
Tas 18.53 16.82 17.32 17.24 17.69 16.89 16.22 15.71 14.35 13.10 13.43 
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, cat. no. 5220.0; Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Statistics. 
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Indicator 2B General government sector indirect taxation, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 9.74 9.90 10.27 10.15 9.71 9.57 9.69 9.51 8.75 9.08 8.98 
Vic 11.45 11.51 11.80 11.88 11.19 11.14 10.95 10.84 10.48 10.42 10.26 
Qld 8.87 9.08 9.92 10.27 9.61 9.10 8.93 9.14 7.83 8.54 8.36 
WA 15.38 15.83 16.60 16.99 17.27 15.52 14.64 13.71 11.29 12.67 10.66 
SA 10.19 9.83 10.44 10.57 10.78 10.51 10.28 10.26 9.97 9.82 9.69 
Tas 9.44 9.39 9.72 9.54 9.56 9.34 8.98 8.97 8.90 8.76 8.68 
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, cat. no. 5220.0; ABS, International Trade in Goods and Services, cat. no. 5368.0; Australian Petroleum 
Production and Exploration Association, Industry Statistics. 
 
Indicator 2C General government sector gross debt, percentage of gross state product 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 16.40 14.33 12.47 11.27 10.90 10.22 9.67 9.46 13.60 17.79 20.11 
Vic 15.54 13.74 12.02 10.25 9.78 9.26 8.80 8.50 13.14 17.78 20.82 
Qld 17.77 15.36 13.85 11.76 10.67 8.66 7.83 9.27 12.96 20.17 26.03 
WA 13.84 11.93 10.41 8.91 7.90 6.19 5.18 4.86 7.26 11.32 11.34 
SA 20.61 18.41 15.71 13.41 12.22 10.88 10.79 10.12 14.95 21.16 24.71 
Tas 30.98 27.74 19.36 15.53 13.44 10.70 9.21 8.82 13.84 18.67 22.35 
Source: ABS, Government Finance Statistics, Australia, cat. no. 5512.0; Commonwealth Budget Papers. 
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Component 3 Government dependency 
 
Indicator 3A Total public sector employment, percentage of population 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 14.45 14.59 14.41 14.47 14.48 14.57 14.40 14.56 14.63 14.86 15.12 
Vic 13.24 13.60 13.48 13.80 13.78 13.86 13.27 13.49 13.95 13.98 14.21 
Qld 15.92 16.30 15.54 15.59 15.23 15.33 15.23 15.24 15.38 15.33 15.30 
WA 15.45 14.79 14.73 15.57 15.38 15.31 15.28 15.34 15.50 15.55 15.52 
SA 15.56 15.10 15.09 15.96 16.29 16.45 16.10 16.46 16.09 15.95 15.78 
Tas 19.41 19.86 19.31 19.90 20.04 19.76 19.96 19.72 20.51 19.96 20.10 
Source: ABS, Wage and Salary Earners, Public Sector, Australia, cat. no. 6248.0. 
 
Indicator 3B Individual social security payment recipients, percentage of population 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 19.34 19.58 19.50 16.32 19.45 19.16 18.77 18.78 19.54 19.85 19.84 
Vic 19.69 19.82 19.68 19.58 19.45 19.08 18.55 18.37 19.01 19.15 19.06 
Qld 20.22 19.91 19.77 19.23 19.03 18.25 17.44 17.10 18.10 18.59 18.74 
WA 17.98 18.32 18.27 17.80 17.35 16.54 15.43 14.99 15.61 15.52 15.25 
SA 23.58 23.57 22.72 22.51 23.08 22.69 22.20 22.03 22.44 22.73 22.96 
Tas 27.86 25.96 25.99 25.87 26.25 25.26 24.72 24.41 24.99 25.30 25.55 
Source: Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Income Support Customers: An Overview. 
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Indicator 3C Social security cash benefits, percentage of gross household income 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 9.07 9.23 9.04 9.37 9.05 8.88 8.59 8.36 10.27 8.86 8.48 
Vic 10.14 9.93 9.65 10.20 9.89 9.74 9.45 9.09 11.42 9.90 9.27 
Qld 11.11 10.89 10.98 11.20 10.58 10.19 9.59 9.32 11.22 9.82 9.41 
WA 9.78 9.25 8.97 9.20 8.87 8.63 7.85 7.16 8.24 7.01 6.48 
SA 12.09 11.76 11.70 12.13 11.99 11.99 11.67 11.06 13.43 11.71 11.19 
Tas 15.46 14.94 14.42 14.89 14.19 13.57 13.02 12.52 15.27 13.30 13.11 
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: State Accounts, cat. no. 5220.0. 
 
Component 4 Regulatory environment 
 
Indicator 4A Number of pages of primary legislation passed or assented 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 11,726 7,849 7,107 9,194 7,847 9,685 9,333 9,041 9,092 9,614 8,561 
Vic 11,318 6,370 10,243 12,350 10,873 12,496 9,552 10,051 10,919 13,183 9,326 
Qld 12,595 7,716 9,888 8,014 8,642 10,524 11,039 10,731 12,514 12,064 11,301 
WA 8,528 5,942 8,296 10,562 7,178 9,900 8,424 9,612 7,950 9,749 9,318 
SA 8,655 4,806 5,490 6,953 6,633 7,477 8,333 7,039 7,901 6,874 8,342 
Tas 10,647 5,646 6,464 7,922 7,958 8,657 7,150 8,060 7,104 8,147 9,095 
Commonwealth legislation, applicable in each state, added to each jurisdiction’s total. 
Source: Commonwealth and state legislation websites. 
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Indicator 4B Number of pages of subordinate legislation passed or assented 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 8,133 7,572 7,390 8,236 7,762 9,072 7,408 7,266 7,824 7,585 7,658 
Vic 7,071 5,601 6,178 8,294 6,204 8,789 7,022 5,960 9,045 5,662 7,176 
Qld 7,131 7,316 8,723 8,798 6,403 9,830 7,104 10,808 8,250 7,983 8,076 
WA 5,918 5,108 5,915 6,918 5,101 8,151 6,977 4,683 6,917 6,129 6,244 
SA 6,403 5,107 5,867 7,150 5,248 8,246 6,766 6,433 7,609 6,151 6,297 
Tas 6,017 5,046 5,394 6,589 4,582 7,502 5,470 4,795 6,550 5,430 5,630 
Commonwealth legislation, applicable in each state, added to each jurisdiction’s total. 
Source: Commonwealth and state legislation websites. 
 
Indicator 4C Number of pages of primary and subordinate legislation per legislative item 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NSW 39 32 30 34 31 37 34 38 35 36 38 
Vic 46 36 45 52 49 57 44 49 55 62 45 
Qld 49 36 42 39 37 48 42 51 54 50 51 
WA 34 27 34 39 30 36 34 40 32 41 36 
SA 30 22 23 28 26 31 30 32 32 30 33 
Tas 40 31 31 36 41 39 34 35 37 36 39 
Commonwealth legislation, applicable in each state, added to each jurisdiction’s total. 
Source: Commonwealth and state legislation websites. 
 
 
